Estimates of Average Marginal Tax Rates on Factor Incomes in Japan, 1980-2003 by GUNJI Hiroshi & MIYAZAKI Kenji
Estimates of Average Marginal Tax Rates on
Factor Incomes in Japan, 1980-2003
著者 Gunji Hiroshi, Miyazaki Kenji
出版者 Institute of Comparative Economic Studies,
Hosei University
journal or
publication title
比較経済研究所ワーキングペーパー
volume 149
page range 1-61
year 2009-11-02
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10114/4308
Estimates of Average Marginal Tax Rates on
Factor Incomes in Japan, 1980{2003
Hiroshi Gunji
Faculty of Economics, Daito Bunka University
Kenji Miyazakiy
Faculty of Economics, Hosei University
October 30, 2009
Abstract
In this paper, we estimate average marginal tax rates on factor
incomes in Japan from 1980 to 2003. We adapt the method of Joines
(1981) [Estimates of eective marginal tax rates on factor incomes.
The Journal of Business 54 (2), 191{226.] to the Japanese tax and
social security system. Average marginal tax rates on labor incomes
without social security premiums decreased from 21% to 17% from
the early 1990s, whereas the rates on incomes with social securities
have remained slightly above 30% since the late 1980s. Tax rates on
capital incomes have uctuated, ranging from 44% to 55%. We also
compare our estimates with average tax rates and the wedges from
business cycle accounting.
Key words: Average marginal tax rates; Japan; Social security; Busi-
ness cycle accounting
JEL classications: E20; E62; H20; O5
We are grateful to Masaru Inaba, Keisuke Otsu, Garry Fleming, and Yosuke Takeda
for many helpful comments, and Chie Hanaoka for excellent research assistance. Financial
support from the Japanese Bankers Association is acknowledged with thanks.
yCorrespondence to: Kenji Miyazaki, Faculty of Economics, Hosei University, 4342
Aihara, Machida, Tokyo, Japan, 194-0298; e-mail: miya ken@hosei.ac.jp; tel: +81-42-
783-2591; fax: +81-42-783-2611
1
1 Introduction
Tax is often introduced into economic models to increase their realism, and
sometimes to evaluate quantitatively welfare levels and policy eects. For
accurate evaluation, estimating eective tax rates in the macroeconomy is
crucial. The average marginal tax rate, which is a weighted average of the
marginal tax rates of economic agents with dierent incomes, is more appro-
priate as an eective tax rate for macroeconomic analysis than is the average
tax rate, which is simply the ratio of total tax revenues to national income.
In this paper, we estimate Japanese average marginal tax rates.
Many researchers have estimated average marginal tax rates for the United
States. Joines (1981) and McGrattan et al. (1997), updating the Joines se-
ries, used the amounts of income and tax revenue for each income bracket to
estimate a series of tax rates on labor and capital incomes. Making fewer as-
sumptions, Seater (1985) and Stephenson (1996), updating the Seater series,
adopted the same method to calculate a series of tax rates on total incomes.
Barro and Sahasakul (1983, 1986) used the statutory rate to compute a series
of tax rates on total incomes. Akhand and Liu (2002) used a nonparametric
approach to estimate a series of average marginal rates on income.
Following Joines (1981), most researchers into average marginal taxes
have attempted to relax these assumptions, but have computed tax rates
only on total incomes. In many studies in which dynamic macroeconomic
models have been calibrated, the Joines (or its updated) series has been used
so that the eects of taxes on each factor income can be evaluated separately.1
1For example, McGrattan (1994), McGrattan et al. (1997), Cole and Ohanian (1991),
Chari et al. (2000), Siu (2006), and McGrattan and Ohanian (2007) used Joines' series.
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To assist macroeconomists investigating the Japanese economy in a similar
way, in this paper we compute average marginal tax rates on capital and
labor incomes by using the methodology of Joines.
To determine the factors that were detrimental to the Japanese economy
after 1990, many researchers have simulated Japanese business cycles in the
1990s by using neoclassical macroeconomic models that incorporate income
tax. Hayashi and Prescott (2002) used a constant capital income tax rate
of 0.480. Braun et al. (2006) set the labor income tax rate to 0.24, and
Esteban-Pretel et al. (2009) set the labor and capital tax rates to 0.28 and
0.44, respectively. In these studies, average tax rates were used as marginal
tax rates; it is important to estimate Japanese marginal tax rates accurately.
To our knowledge, the only estimated average marginal tax rates on factor
incomes for Japan are those obtained by McKee et al. (1986).2 The paucity of
studies may be a product of the Japanese tax system. Many OECD countries
adopt the withholding income tax system, under which wages and salaries
are taxed at source, and employees usually le a nal tax return to make a
year-end tax adjustment. In Japan, however, most employees have no such
incentive because employers are obliged to make year-end tax adjustments
for their employees. This makes it dicult to determine average marginal
tax rates for all taxpayers.
To be specic, we divide Japanese taxpayers into three categories: work-
ers not ling a nal tax return; workers ling a nal tax return; and other
taxpayers ling a nal tax return. The rst two are withholding income
2McKee et al. calculate tax rates for 1979, 1981, and 1983 only, without using time
series data.
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taxpayers, and the last two are self-assessment income taxpayers. For the
US, where most are self-assessment income taxpayers, the Statistics of In-
come published by the Internal Revenue Service can provide data on almost
all taxpayers' tax revenues for each income bracket. In Japan, the Sample
Survey for Self-assessment Income (Shinkoku Shotoku Zei Hyohon Chosa)
and the Statistical Survey of Actual Status for Salary in the Private Sector
(Minkan Kyuyo Jittai Tokei Chosa), published by the National Tax Agency,
present tax data for each income bracket. Thus, with some assumptions, one
can construct series of average marginal tax rates for both self-assessment
income taxpayers and withholding income taxpayers. The challenge is to
estimate average marginal tax rates for all taxpayers by combining these se-
ries. In Japan, workers ling a nal tax return are both self-assessment and
withholding income taxpayers, and they are included in both surveys.
To overcome this diculty in estimating average marginal tax rates, we
use a weight to estimate total average marginal tax rates. The weight is
chosen so that the average tax rate on total income is equal to a weighted
sum of average tax rates on self-assessment incomes and average tax rates
on withholding incomes. By using this weight, we treat the weighted sum
of the average marginal tax rates for self-assessment taxpayers and those for
withholding income as the total average marginal tax rates. Furthermore,
one can broadly consider social security premiums as a component of taxes
on labor income. We calculate average marginal social security premiums
rates and add them to the average marginal tax rates on labor incomes.
Our results can be summarized as follows. Although average marginal tax
rates without social security premiums have declined from 21% to 17% since
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the early 1990s, the tax rates including social security payments are generally
about 10 percentage points higher, and have remained slightly above 30%
since the late 1980s. Therefore, when calibrating the Japanese economy, it
is reasonable to set the parameter for the labor tax rate to 0.3. Average
marginal tax rates on capital incomes range from 44% to 55%, and have
fallen by 10 percentage points since 2003 because of the cut in corporation
tax.
In addition, we make two comparisons. We rst compare our results with
the series of Japanese average tax rates obtained by Mendoza et al. (1994).
Their average rates on labor incomes are higher than our marginal tax rates
because of Japan's regressive social security contributions. Their average
rates without contribution rates are lower than ours by around 1 percentage
point. This can be interpreted as the eect of the progressiveness of income
tax. The average rates on capital income obtained by Mendoza et al. are
slightly lower than ours.
Second, we compare our results with the Japanese labor and capital
wedges from business cycle accounting (BCA) obtained by Kobayashi and
Inaba (2006). The average marginal taxes on labor incomes account for 70%
of labor wedges in terms of level and correlation. The dierence, however,
is getting wider. This may be the result of shorter working hours, as sug-
gested by Hayashi and Prescott (2002), or may be the result of the recent
rapidly accumulating scal decit. The average marginal tax rates on capital
incomes cannot capture the uctuations in the capital wedge.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 (resp. 3), we compute av-
erage marginal tax rates on labor and capital incomes excluding (resp. includ-
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ing) social security premium rates. In Section 4, we compare our estimated
tax rates with the average tax rates computed by Mendoza et al. (1994). In
Section 5, we compare our rates with the labor and capital wedges from BCA
obtained by Kobayashi and Inaba (2006). In Section 6, we oer concluding
remarks.
2 Average Marginal Tax Rates excluding So-
cial Security Premium Rates
In this section, we calculate average marginal tax rates without including
social security premium rates. The average marginal tax rates on labor and
capital incomes are denoted by MTRL and MTRK, respectively. Economic
agents comprise two types of taxpayers: self-assessment taxpayers and with-
holding taxpayers. We calculate the average marginal tax rates for both
types of taxpayers. By combining these gures with an appropriate weight,
we estimate the total average marginal tax rates. In Section 2.1, we explain
the calculation of average marginal tax rates for self-assessment income tax-
payers. In Section 2.2, we explain the calculation of the average marginal
tax rates for withholding income taxpayers. In Section 2.3, we report the
average marginal tax rates for the macroeconomic level.
Before describing our procedure, we comment on our sample period. Our
estimated marginal average tax rates on factor incomes in Japan cover the
period from 1980 to 2003. The main reason for using this sample period is to
allow us to use data from the 1993 System of National Accounts (93SNA),
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with the base year as 1997. Although the 68SNA has data from 1950, the
data only go up to 2000. Using the 93SNA (base 2002) to extend the series
limits our series to starting at 1994. Furthermore, data on local taxes are
only available up to 2006. Thus, we use 93SNA (base 1997) to compute
marginal average tax rates from 1980{2003.
2.1 Average marginal tax rates for self-assessment in-
come taxpayers
In this subsection, we consider the average marginal tax rates for self-assessment
income taxpayers. We calculate these by using the methodology of Joines
(1981). For computing average marginal tax rates for self-assessment taxpay-
ers, our main data source is the Sample Survey for Self-assessment Income
Tax produced by the National Tax Agency. This survey provides data on
several types of incomes for each income bracket. We classify these incomes
into labor and capital incomes, and then estimate the average tax rates for
each income bracket. For other taxes, only total revenues are available. Each
tax item is classied as a proportional tax on either capital income or total
income. Adding the proportional taxes to the average marginal tax rates
for the self-assessment incomes yields the average marginal tax rates for self-
assessment income taxpayers.
We assume that taxpayers are homogeneous for each income bracket. The
total income of group i (i = 1; : : : ; N) is denoted yi = yli + yki, where yli
and yki represent labor and capital incomes, respectively. Following Joines
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(1981), the amount of tax revenues of group i, ts(yi) is:
ts(yi) = yi + kyki + f( ~yi);
where  denotes the proportional tax rate on total income, k is the propor-
tional tax rate on capital income, f() represents the progressive tax func-
tion, ~yi = iyi denotes the income that is progressively taxed, and i is the
fraction of taxable income of group i. In this subsection, there are no propor-
tional taxes on labor incomes. Joines (1981) considered two progressive tax
functions for labor and capital incomes and assumed the fraction of taxable
income to be constant for each income. By contrast, we consider one progres-
sive tax function, but assume that the fraction of taxable income depends on
i.
The marginal tax rates of group i on labor and capital incomes are:
dts(yi)=dyli =  + if
0
i
dts(yi)=dyki =  + k + if
0
i ;
where f 0i represents the progressive tax rates schedule. Each marginal rate
of income tax is divided into proportional and nonproportional rates.
We aggregate the marginal rates across groups to calculate the aver-
age marginal tax rates on labor and capital incomes (that is, MTRLs and
MTRKs, respectively). Letting total tax revenues be T s =
PN
i=1 t
s(yi), let-
ting total labor income be Yl =
PN
i=1 yli, and letting total capital income be
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Yk =
PN
i=1 yki, we obtain:
MTRLs = dT
s
dYl
=
PN
i=1
dts(yi)
dYl
=
PN
i=1
dts(yi)
dyli
dyli
dYl
MTRKs = dT
s
dYk
=
PN
i=1
dts(yi)
dYk
=
PN
i=1
dts(yi)
dyki
dyki
dYk
:
Following Joines (1981), we assume that dyli=dYl = yli=Yl and dyki=dYk =
yki=Yk. The assumption simplies the above equations to:
MTRLs =  +
NX
i=1
iwlif
0
i (1)
MTRKs =  + k +
NX
i=1
iwkif
0
i ; (2)
where wli = yli=Yl and wki = yki=Yk. MTRL
s and MTRKs are weighted
averages of the marginal tax rates on labor and capital incomes for group i,
with wli and wki respectively. The weights wli and wki represent the shares
of labor and capital incomes that are subject to nonproportional taxes.
We now investigate how the available Japanese data can be used to cal-
culate  , k, i, f
0
i , wli, and wkl in (1) and (2). We then report our results
for the average marginal tax rates of self-assessment taxpayers.
2.1.1 Estimation of 
The proportional tax rate on total income  is:
 =
amounts of proportional tax on total incomes
amounts of total incomes
:
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To compute the denominator, one can use nominal national product (NNP)
or national income at market prices from the Annual Reports on the National
Accounts (Kokumin Keizai Keisan Nenpo), which is produced by the Eco-
nomic and Social Research Institute, the Cabinet Oce. An alternative to
NNP would be national income (NI) at factor cost. However, as Joines (1981)
explains, NI excludes net indirect tax, which is the dierence between NNP
and NI, in taxable income, which, in theory, allows tax rates that exceed
100%. Hence, we follow Joines and use NNP for total income.
The numerator, the total amount of proportional tax, is:
total national tax revenues  income tax  corporation tax
 land tax  securities transaction tax + local proportional tax:
Except for those on local proportional tax, we can obtain all the required
data from Chapter 1 (Overview) of the National Tax Agency Annual Statis-
tics Reports (Kokuzeicho Tokei Nenposho). We subtract self-assessment and
withholding income taxes and national proportional tax on capital income
from the total amount of national tax revenue, and add local proportional
tax to obtain the total amount of proportional tax. Land taxes, introduced
in 1996, have been suspended since 1998. Securities transaction taxes were
abolished in 1999. Local proportional taxes are computed by subtracting
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local proportional taxes on capital income from total local taxes, as follows:
(total prefectural tax revenues business tax real property acquisition tax)
+ (totalmunicipal tax revenues  xed asset tax  mine production tax
  special landholding tax  enterprise tax):
Data on these items can be obtained from the Annual Statistical Reports
on Local Government Finance (Chiho Zaisei Tokei Nenpo), produced by the
Ministry of Internal Aairs and Communications.
2.1.2 Estimation of k
Similarly to  , the proportional tax rates on capital incomes k are computed
from the following:
k =
amounts of proportional tax on capital incomes
amounts of capital incomes
:
We interpret the denominator as NNP, where 1   is labor's share in NNP,
which is given by:
(1  )NI =compensation of employees
+ (1  )unincorporated enterprises income:
The incomes of unincorporated enterprises are the sum of their operating
surpluses and net receivable incomes. Net indirect taxes (=NNP NI) and
the total income of unincorporated enterprises are intermingled and dicult
to divide into distinct capital and labor incomes. Therefore, we allocate them
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to labor and capital incomes based on the shares of labor and capital in total
income.
The numerator, the amount of proportional tax on capital incomes, is
the amount subtracted from total tax revenues excluding income tax when
calculating  . That is:
corporation tax + land tax + securities transaction tax
+local proportional tax on capital income:
The local proportional tax on capital incomes is:
(business tax + real property acquisition tax)
+(xed asset tax mine production tax + special landholding tax  enterprise tax):
The source for all data (except for data on the local proportional tax on
capital income) is Chapter 1 (Overview) of the National Tax Agency An-
nual Statistics Reports. For calculating the local proportional tax on capital
income, we use the Annual Statistical Reports on Local Government Finance.
2.1.3 Estimation of i
The ratio of taxable income to total income for each income bracket i, i,
is estimated for each income group i from Section 2-5 (Results of Sample
Survey for Self-assessment Income Tax, excerpt) of the National Tax Agency
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Annual Statistics Reports :
i =
amounts of taxable income
total income
:
2.1.4 Estimation of f 0i
The derivative of the progressive tax function for each income bracket i, f 0i ,
is calculated from the following formula:
f 0i =
(ri=ni)  (ri 1=ni 1)
(~yi=ni)  (~yi 1=ni 1) ;
where ri is the amount of income tax, ni is the number of taxpayers, and ~yi
is the amount of taxable income for each income bracket i. These gures are
taken from Section 2-5 of the National Tax Agency Annual Statistics Reports.
To compute ri, we use the sum of withholding and self-assessment income
taxes in Table 1 of Section 2-5. This is because there is a subtle discrepancy
between the amount of tax minus the amount of tax credit and the amount
of withholding income tax plus the amount of self-assessment income taxes
in the table.
2.1.5 Estimation of wli and wki
To estimate the distribution of labor and capital incomes subject to the
nonproportional taxes, wli and wki, we must determine whether each type
of assessment income is either labor or capital income. Having divided all
incomes into three (labor income (yli), capital income (yki), and miscellaneous
income (ymi)), Joines (1981) considered two cases: one in which ymi belongs
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to labor income and the other in which it belongs to capital income.3 Our
allocation of ymi based on labor and capital income shares is novel.
Specically, the reported income items in Table (3) of Section 2-5 (Results
of Sample Survey for Self-assessment Income Tax, excerpt) of the National
Tax Agency Annual Statistics Reports are classied into the following three
types of income:
1. Labor income (yli): employment income and retirement income;
2. Capital income (yki): interest income, dividend income, real estate
income, comprehensive capital gains, short-term separate capital gains,
long-term separate capital gains, and capital gains from stocks, etc.;
3. Miscellaneous income (ymi): business income, farm income, miscella-
neous income, timber income, and occasional income.
Capital gains on stocks, etc. have been taxed since 1989. Our classication
closely follows that of Joines (1981). Having discussed including capital gains
in capital incomes, Joines (1981) computed marginal tax rates both with and
without their inclusion. However, in most studies based on Joines' data, tax
rates are based on including capital gains. We consider only the case in which
capital gains are included in capital incomes.4
We further divide the case with capital gains into three subcases: in the
rst, miscellaneous incomes are allocated to labor income; in the second,
they are allocated to capital income; in the third case, they are allocated to
3In most studies based on Joines' data, miscellaneous income is classied as labor
income.
4Our estimated tax rates based on excluding capital gains are available from the authors
on request.
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both incomes based on factor shares. Joines (1981) used only the rst two
subcases. Because the rst two are extreme cases, we next explain the third
case.
Total labor incomes of self-assessment income taxpayers are denoted by
Y sl =
PN
i=1 yli. The total amount of capital income is denoted by Y
s
k =PN
i=1 yki. The total amount of miscellaneous incomes is denoted by Y
s
m =PN
i=1 ymi. We suppose that the income shares of each income bracket are the
same as the macroeconomic income shares. By using the labor share 1   ,
we assume that miscellaneous incomes of (1  )ymi and ymi are attributed
to labor and capital incomes, respectively. Then, the distributions of labor
and capital incomes subject to nonproportional taxes are:
wli =
yli + (1  )ymi
Yli + (1  )Ymi and wki =
yki + (1  )ymi
Yki + (1  )Ymi :
When  = 0, all miscellaneous incomes are treated as labor incomes, and
when  = 1, all are treated as capital incomes.
2.1.6 Estimation of the average marginal tax rates of self-assessment
income taxpayers
The above computations can be used to calculate the average marginal tax
rates of self-assessment income taxpayers on labor incomes (MTRLs) and
capital incomes (MTRKs). As already explained, we consider three cases
relating to the treatment of miscellaneous incomes. The average marginal
tax rates computed are dened as follows:
1. MTRLs0 andMTRK
s
0 : based on miscellaneous incomes being allocated
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to labor incomes;
2. MTRLs1 andMTRK
s
1 : based on miscellaneous incomes being allocated
to capital incomes;
3. MTRLs andMTRK
s
 : based on miscellaneous incomes being allocated
to both incomes based on factor shares.
The results are summarized in Table 1. The tax rates MTRLs and MTRK
s

lie between the two extreme cases. Below, we designateMTRLs andMTRK
s

as our main results.
+++ INSERT TABLE 1 HERE. +++
Figure 1 plots the average marginal tax ratesMTRLs andMTRK
s
 , in which
miscellaneous incomes are allocated to labor and capital incomes according
to factor shares. The average marginal tax rate on capital income exceeded
70% in 1987, since when it gradually declined. The average marginal tax
rate on labor incomes declined throughout the period.
+++ INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE. +++
2.2 Average marginal tax rates for withholding income
taxpayers
In this subsection, we calculate the average marginal tax rates of self-assessment
income taxpayers. The Statistical Survey of Actual Status for Salary in the
Private Sector, published by the National Tax Agency, provides data on the
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amounts of taxes for each income bracket. However, this survey only pro-
vides such detailed information for employees working in the private sector
throughout the year. One cannot obtain sucient data for workers in the
public sector. Because this survey includes data on individual companies, it
does not cover employees working in more than one company. In addition,
it does not cover withholding income taxpayers, who do not earn wages and
salaries.
Because of such data limitations, we make the following ve assumptions.
1. We treat withholding taxes on income except wages and salaries as
proportional taxes.
2. The income distribution of workers in the public sector is the same as
that in the private sector.
3. The income distribution of employees working throughout the year is
the same as that for employees who only work for part of the year.
4. We ignore employees who earn their salaries from more than one com-
pany.
5. We ignore withholding taxpayers who do not earn wage and salaries.
Given these assumptions, we can estimate the average marginal tax rates of
self-assessment income taxpayers.
Because the salaries of Japanese public servants are determined based on
the salaries of large-scale private corporations, the second assumption would
make the estimated rates lower than the actual rates. On the other hand,
the third assumption might make the estimated rates higher than the actual
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rates. We suggest that the numbers of taxpayers to whom the fourth and
fth assumptions apply are negligible for calculating total average marginal
tax rates.
Note that most employees do not le a nal tax return. Under the
Japanese system, withholding income taxation is the responsibility not of
employees but of the employers, who make year-end tax adjustments to
pay for withholding income taxpayers. When employees earn their employ-
ment income from more than one company or receive income in addition to
employment incomes, they should make a year-end tax adjustment. Thus,
some withholding income taxpayers are also self-assessment income taxpay-
ers. This issue is discussed in Section 2.3, in which we calculate the overall
average marginal tax rates on labor and capital incomes.
Below, we explain the computation of average marginal tax rates for with-
holding income taxpayers. As are self-assessment income taxpayers, with-
holding income taxpayers are assumed to be homogeneous for each income
bracket. The tax revenue of group i, tw(yi), is:
tw(yi) = yi + kyki + 
w
k yki + 
w
l yl1i + g(yl2i);
where  and k are as dened in the previous subsection, 
w
k is the additional
rate of proportional taxation on the capital incomes of withholding taxpayers,
wl is the rate of proportional taxation on labor incomes except employment
incomes, yl1i is labor income except employment income, yl2i is employment
income (that is, yli = yl1i+yl2i), and g() represents the progressive tax func-
tion for employment income. Unlike self-assessment income tax, withholding
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income tax is assumed to be represented by: wk yki + 
w
l yl1i + g(yl2i). This
is because the available data only record the amount of tax for each income
bracket.
The marginal tax rates of group i are:
dtw(yi)=dyli =  + 
w
l
dyl1i
dyli
+ g0i
dyl2i
dyli
dtw(yi)=dyki =  + k + 
w
k :
We assume that dyl1i=dyli = yl1i=yli and dyk1i=dyki = yk1i=yki. There-
fore, similar to the previous subsection, letting total tax revenues be Tw =PN
i=1 t
w(yi), letting total labor incomes be Yl =
PN
i=1 yli, and letting total
capital be Yk =
PN
i=1 yki, we obtain:
MTRLw =  + ~wl +
NX
i=1
~wlig
0
i
MTRKw =  + k + 
w
k ;
where:
~wl = 
w
l
PN
i=1 yl1i
Yl
and ~wli =
yl2i
Yl
:
In what follows, we explain how to use the available data to calculate
average marginal tax rates. Because  and k are as dened in the previous
subsection, we explain how to use the available data to construct ~wl , 
w
k ,
g0i, and ~wli. Then, we report our calculated average marginal tax rates for
withholding income taxpayers.
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2.2.1 Estimation of ~wl and 
w
k
To estimate ~wl and 
w
k , we need data on the amount of taxes for each factor
income. As in the previous subsection, miscellaneous incomes are dicult to
classify as either capital or labor incomes. We consider three cases: the case
in which miscellaneous incomes count as labor incomes; the case in which
miscellaneous incomes count as capital incomes; and the case in which these
incomes are allocated to labor and capital incomes based on factor shares.
For withholding income taxpayers, all types of income, except for employ-
ment income (Yl2), can be classied into one of the following three categories:
1. Labor income, except for employment income (Y wl1 ): retirement income;
2. Capital income (Y wk ): interest income, dividend income, and capital
gains on listed stocks;
3. Miscellaneous income (Y wm ): remuneration, fees, and the incomes of
nonresidents.
Let the corresponding total tax revenues be denote by Twl1 , T
w
k , and T
w
m.
These gures, as well those for the total amount of employment income,
Y wl2 , are available from Section 3-1 (Statistics of Taxation) of the National
Tax Agency Annual Statistics Reports. Whereas capital incomes are taxed
proportionally, retirement incomes are not. Although taxable retirement in-
comes after deductions are taxed progressively under the Japanese taxation
system, because of limited data availability, we assume that retirement in-
comes are taxed proportionally.
For calculating ~wl and 
w
k , we consider three cases: the case in which
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miscellaneous incomes are treated as labor incomes; the case in which mis-
cellaneous incomes are treated as capital incomes; and the case in which
these incomes are treated as either labor or capital incomes in proportion to
the corresponding factor shares. Because the rst two are extreme cases, we
explain the computation of ~wl and 
w
k in the third case. By using labor's
share 1 , we divide miscellaneous incomes into labor incomes (1 )Y wm and
capital incomes Y wm , respectively. Therefore, ~
w
l and 
w
k can be estimated
from:
~wl =
Twl1 + (1  )Twm
Y wl1 + Y
w
l2 + (1  )Y wm
and wk =
Twk + T
w
m
Y wk + Y
w
m
:
When  = 0, all miscellaneous incomes are treated as labor incomes, and
when  = 1, all miscellaneous incomes are treated as capital incomes.
2.2.2 Estimation of g0i
The derivative of the progressive tax function for each income bracket i, g0i,
is calculated from the following formula:
g0i =
(ri=ni)  (ri 1=ni 1)
(yl2i=ni)  (yl2i 1=ni 1) ;
where ri is the amount of withholding tax on employment income, ni is the
number of taxpayers, and yl2i is the level of employment income for income
group i. These gures are available from Table 6 (Breakdown of the number
of employment income earners, total amount of salary and amount of tax by
range of salary, employment income earners who worked through a year) of
Section 3-2 (The Results of the Statistical Survey of Actual Status for Salary
in the Private Sector, excerpt) in the National Tax Agency Annual Statistics
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Reports.
2.2.3 Estimation of ~wli
To compute the distribution of labor incomes subject to nonproportional
taxes, ~wli, we must make some adjustments. The total amount of employ-
ment income from Table 6 of Section 3-2 in the National Tax Agency Annual
Statistics Reports,
PN
i=1 yl2i, is not the same as that from Table 1 of Section
3-1 (Statistics of Taxation), Y wl2 . The former is based on the incomes of those
who work throughout the year in the private sector, whereas the latter in-
cludes public servants and temporary workers. We assume that the income
distribution of public servants and temporary workers is the same as that of
earners working throughout the year in the private sector.5
Thus, when miscellaneous incomes are allocated to both labor and capital
incomes in proportion to the corresponding factor shares, the weight becomes:
~wli =
yl2i
Y wl1 + Y
w
l2 + (1  )Y wm
 Y
w
l2PN
i=1 y2li
:
Note that Y wl1 , Y
w
l2 , and Y
w
m are as dened previously. Data on these items
can obtained from Table 1 of Section 3-1 in the National Tax Agency Annual
Statistics Reports. Data on yl2i comes from Table 6 of Section 3-2. When
 = 0 (resp.  = 1), all miscellaneous incomes are allocated to labor incomes
(resp. capital incomes).
5The bias generated by making this assumption might be at least partially oset by the
fact that, in Japan, public servants earn relatively high incomes and temporary workers
earn relatively low incomes.
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2.2.4 Estimation of the average marginal tax rates of withholding
income taxpayers
Using the calculations obtained above, we calculate the average marginal
tax rates on labor incomes (MTRLw) and capital incomes (MTRKw) of
withholding income taxpayers. As in the previous section, in calculating
average marginal tax rates, we consider the following three treatments of
miscellaneous incomes:
1. MTRLw0 and MTRK
w
0 : miscellaneous incomes are treated as labor
incomes;
2. MTRLw1 and MTRK
w
1 : miscellaneous incomes are treated as capital
incomes;
3. MTRLw and MTRK
w
 : miscellaneous incomes are allocated to labor
and capital incomes in proportion to the corresponding factor shares.
The results are summarized in Table 2.
+++ INSERT TABLE 2 HERE. +++
Figure 2 plots the average marginal tax rates MTRLw and MTRK
w

based on miscellaneous incomes being allocated in proportion to factor shares.
Average marginal tax rates on labor incomes peaked at the beginning of the
1990s. This coincides with the period in which the Japanese government
introduced substantial tax cuts to stimulate the economy. Compared with
Figure 1, the average marginal tax rates on both factor incomes for withhold-
ing income taxpayers are below those of self-assessment income taxpayers.
+++ INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE. +++
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2.3 Estimation of total average marginal tax rates
We have divided taxpayers into two types, and computed the marginal tax
rates on both factor incomes. Based on these computations, we estimate
total average marginal tax rates at the macroeconomic level. As already dis-
cussed, some withholding taxpayers make year-end tax adjustments. Thus,
the withholding income taxpayers who make declarations are included in
both the Sample Survey for Self-assessment Income Tax and the Statisti-
cal Survey of Actual Status for Salary in the Private Sector. Ideally, one
would divide taxpayers into those paying only self-assessment income tax,
those paying only withholding income tax, and those paying both types of
tax. In addition, one should take into account the numbers of self-assessment
and withholding taxpayers and of the income levels and taxes in all income
brackets, and then, to compute average marginal tax rates, one should use
as weights the proportions of self-assessment and withholding taxpayers.
However, data limitations prevent us from applying these procedures, and
all we can do is compute the average marginal tax rates of self-assessment
income taxpayers and withholding income taxpayers. We also use an alterna-
tive weight to compute the average marginal tax rates, denoted by . When
miscellaneous incomes are allocated to labor and capital incomes according
to factor shares, the total average marginal tax rates on factor incomes can
be computed from:
MTRL = MTRL
s
 + (1  )MTRLw ;
MTRK = MTRK
s
 + (1  )MTRKw :
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When  = 0 ( = 1), all miscellaneous incomes are treated as labor (capital)
incomes.
The weight  is chosen so that the average tax rate on total income is
equal to a weighted average of the average tax rate on self-assessment income
and that on withholding income. That is:
total income tax
total income
= 
self-assessed income tax
self-assessed income
+(1 )withholding income tax
withholding income
:
The denominator on the left side of the above equation can be calculated from
the Annual Reports on the National Accounts prepared by the Economic and
Social Research Institute, the Cabinet Oce. The data required to compute
the other terms are available from the National Tax Agency Annual Statistics
Reports.
Using the sum of the total incomes of self-assessment and withholding
income taxpayers to compute the denominator on the left side would lead
to double counting. Thus, for total income, we sum up the compensation
of employees, the property incomes of households, and the incomes of enter-
prises and unincorporated enterprises from Table 2 (Distribution of National
Income and National Disposable Income) in Chapter 4 (Main Time Series)
of Part 1 (Flow) of the Annual Reports on the National Accounts.
The numerator on the left side is the sum of the total amount of self-
assessment income tax from Table 1 of Section 2-5 in the National Tax Agency
Annual Statistics Reports. The total amount of withholding income tax is
from Table 1 of Section 3-1 of the same source. Note that the total amount
of self-assessment income tax in Table 1 has already subtracted from the
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total amount of withholding income. The denominator of the rst term on
the left side is computed from the total amount of income in Table 1 of
Section 2-5, and the numerator is obtained from the sum of self-assessment
and withholding income taxes in the same table. The denominator of the
second term is calculated from the sum of the payment amounts for each
income type in Tables 4 to 9 of Section 3-1. The numerator is taken from
the total amount of withholding income taxes in Table 1 of the same section.
Based on the weight  for each scal year, we compute weighted averages
of the average marginal tax rates of self-assessment and withholding income
taxpayers to obtain the total average marginal tax rates on labor and capital
incomes. The results are presented in Table 3. Figure 3 illustrates MTRL
and MTRK. Total average marginal tax rates are similar to those for with-
holding income taxpayers, because more weight is assigned to withholding
taxpayers than to self-assessment income taxpayers.
The average marginal tax rate on labor income generally increased until
the early 1990s and peaked at 21%. Since then, the rate fell to reach 17% in
2003. As discussed in the previous subsection, this decline is arguably the
result of Japan's lengthy economic slump (the so-called \lost decade") and of
tax-cutting reforms designed to stimulate the Japanese economy. Note that
these tax rates do not incorporate social security premiums. As discussed in
the introduction, social security contributions can be broadly considered as
taxes on labor incomes. In the next section, we calculate average marginal
tax rates that incorporate social security premium rates.
The average marginal tax rate on capital incomes is at least 30% higher
than the average marginal tax rate on labor incomes, mainly because of
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corporation tax. Tax rates on capital have uctuated between 46% and 57%
and peaked twice during the sample period; rst in 1987{89 and again in
1995{2001. Rates fell in 1990 and 2003, perhaps because the tax system was
reformed in both years.
+++ INSERT TABLE 3 AND FIGURE 3 HERE. +++
3 Average Marginal Tax Rates including So-
cial Security Premium Rates
As noted in Section 1, social security premiums can be broadly interpreted
as taxes. In this section, we estimate the average marginal tax rates in-
cluding social security premiums, denoted by MMTRL. The ve types of
social security payments considered are pension insurance, health insurance,
employment insurance, accident compensation insurance, and long-term care
insurance. In the following subsections, we calculate the average marginal
premium rates for each security payment. In the nal subsection, we add up
those rates to obtain total marginal average rates of social security premiums,
MSST . We then estimate MMTRL by adding MMST to the marginal av-
erage rates excluding social security premiums, MTRL, estimated in the
previous section. In addition, we estimate the average rates of social security
premiums, ASST , and compute AMTRL = ASST +MTRL. This is done
to enable us to examine the regressive eect of social security payments and
the progressive eect of tax rates (excluding social security).
Before estimating the premium rates on labor incomes for each type of
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social security, we address three issues. First, the average marginal rates of
social security premiums, MSST , are smaller than the average rates ASST .
In Japan, labor incomes are subject to the ve social security payments
listed above. Premiums for employment insurance, accident compensation
insurance, and long-term care insurance are proportional to labor incomes
and, accordingly, the marginal and average premiums rates are equivalent.
By contrast, some types of pension and health insurance require contributors
to pay at fees, in which case the marginal premium rates are zero.
Second, MSST and MTRL are based on dierent weights. We use the
income ratio as the weight for MTRL. However, for the MSST weight,
because of limited data availability, we use the ratio of the number of insured
persons to the total number of workers (the labor force). Insured persons
paying lump-sum contributions are generally low incomes earners. Therefore,
total average marginal rates based on the numbers of insured persons are
below those based on income levels.
Third, social security payments for employees are paid by both employees
and employers. Thus, the eective rates for social security premiums should
be estimated in the following way. Let wB and wA denote the before-tax and
after-tax wage rates, respectively. This means that wB = (1 + e)w
A, where
e is a tax on employers' payments of wages. The before-tax wage rate for
employees is wA = wB=(1 + e), so the after-tax wage rate is as follows:
(1  l)wA = 1  l
1 + e
wB =

1  l + e
1 + e

wB:
Therefore, the eective tax rate paid by both employers and employees is
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(l + e)=(1 + e).
3.1 Average marginal premium rates for pension in-
surance
In this subsection, we estimate the average marginal rates of pension insur-
ance. Pension insurance is classied into: (i) the National Pension; (ii) Em-
ployees' Pension Insurance; and (iii) the Mutual Aid Associations' Pension.
The Mutual Aid Associations consist of (ii-1) the Mutual Aid Association
of National Government Employees; (ii-2) the Mutual Aid Association of
Local Government Employees; (ii-3) the Mutual Aid Corporation of Private
School Personnel; (ii-4) the Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries Organiza-
tion Employees Mutual Aid Association; (ii-5) the Mutual Aid Associations
of Public Corporation Employees; (ii-6) the Seamen's Insurance; and (ii-7)
the Farmer Pension Fund.6 Every Japanese person above the age of 20 is
required by law to join one of these associations. We use the statutory rates
and the number of members covered by each type of insurance to calculate
the weighted average of these premium rates. The marginal premium rate
is the corresponding statutory rate when the premium is proportional to the
income level, and the weight is the ratio of the number of persons covered
by each type of insurance to the total labor force. Data on the numbers
of insured persons and the statutory insurance premium rates are from the
Social Security Year Book (Shakai Hosho Nenkan) published by the National
Federation of Health Insurance Societies.
6The last three associations (ii-5){(ii-7) were liquidated in 1983, 1985, and 1985, re-
spectively.
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In calculating the average marginal rates of pension insurance, two points
require careful attention. First, the national pension is dierent from the
other pensions. The premium for the national pension is constant and inde-
pendent of the level of income and, thus, the marginal premium rate should
be set to zero. In addition, contributors to the national pension are not
necessarily part of the labor force. We therefore consider the contributors to
the national pension to comprise the labor force excluding the contributors
to other pension funds.7 This allows us to make the sum of the contributors
to these pension funds equal to the labor force. Labor force data are scal
year averages from the Labour Force Survey (Rodoryoku Chosa) published
by the Ministry of Internal Aairs and Communications.
Second, except for the case of the national pension, adjustments are re-
quired when using statutory rates on employment incomes. Employment in-
comes are divided into regular earnings and special earnings, and the latter,
paid twice a year, typically accounts for a large share of overall labor incomes
in Japan. Before 2002, the statutory premium rate was imposed only on reg-
ular earnings,8 and another, much lower, rate is imposed on special earnings.
Since the introduction of the total remuneration system in 2003, both types
of earnings are subject to the same rate of pension insurance. Thus, we must
7For the number of contributors to the national pension, one could also use the number
of insured persons in class 1 who are neither members of the employees' pension insurance
scheme nor members of a mutual aid association and are not dependent spouses of any
member of the national pension scheme. In this case, the marginal premium rate is zero
because the number of people in the labor force minus all pension contributors is same as
the number of uninsured people, or the unpaid labor force. Therefore, the estimation is
unaected.
8To be precise, the monthly amount of the premium was calculated from the product of
the statutory rates and the index of monthly regular earnings, which rounds o fractions
of actual monthly payments.
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recalculate the premium rate on total employment incomes. Unfortunately,
we cannot obtain data on the amounts of special earnings or on the premium
rate on special earnings for each pension fund from the Social Security Year
Book.
To recalculate the premium rates, we assume that the premiums on special
earnings before 2002 were zero. We then construct the ratio of employment
earnings to total earnings from a dierent data source. We estimate the rates
of pension insurance (except for the national pension) on labor incomes by
using the product of the statutory rates and the adjustment coecient ,
dened as:
 =
annual cash earnings
annual cash earnings + annual special earnings
:
Annual earnings are computed from the sum of the monthly contractual cash
earnings in each year. The data on cash earnings and special earnings are
from the Basic Survey on the Wage Structure (Chingin Kozo Kihon Tokei
Chosa Houkoku) published by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare.
3.2 Average marginal premium rates for health insur-
ance
In this subsection, we estimate the average marginal rates of health insur-
ance. The ve types of health insurance are: the health insurance managed
by government and by associations; National Health Insurance; Employees'
Insurance; Day-Laborers' Health Insurance; Seamen's Insurance; and Mu-
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tual Aid Association Insurance.9 As in the case of pension insurance, every
Japanese person aged over 20 is required to join one of these associations by
law. We use the statutory rates and the numbers of insured members to cal-
culate the weighted average of these premium rates. The marginal premium
rate is the corresponding statutory rate when the premium is proportional
to the income level, and the weights are the ratios of the numbers of insured
members to the total labor force. The data used for our calculations are
available from the Social Security Year Book, the Labour Force Survey, and
the Basic Survey on the Wage Structure.
For calculating the marginal rates for health insurance, two points require
careful consideration. First, as in the previous subsection, national health
insurance is dierent from the other types of insurance. Because the premium
is eectively constant, we set its premium rate to zero. Because contributors
are not necessarily part of the labor force, we assume that the number of
contributors to the national health insurance scheme can be obtained by
subtracting the number of contributors to other health insurance schemes
from the total labor force.
Second, as in the previous subsection, adjustments are needed when using
statutory rates on employment incomes. The total remuneration system was
introduced into health insurance in 2003, and dierent rates were imposed
on regular earnings and special earnings before 2002. Fortunately, data on
insurance premium rates on special earnings for health insurance are avail-
able. Therefore, our estimates of the average marginal premium rates before
9As described in the previous subsection, the Mutual Aid Association consists of seven
associations: (ii-1){(ii-7). However, because of limited data availability, we use the rst
four associations to calculate the average marginal premium rates.
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2002 are:
 (rate on regular earnings) + (1  ) (rate on special earnings):
where  is as dened in the previous subsection. According to this equation,
the premium rate is the insurance rate on cash earnings plus that on special
earnings.
3.3 Average marginal premium rates for employment
insurance
In this subsection, we estimate the average marginal rates for employment
insurance. The three types of employment insurance are: Employment In-
surance for General Persons; Day-Laborers' Insurance; and Seamen's Insur-
ance. We use the statutory rates and the numbers of insured members in
each scheme to calculate the weighted average of these premium rates. The
marginal premium rate is the corresponding statutory rate when the pre-
mium is proportional to the income level, and the weights are the ratios of
the numbers of insured members to the labor force. These data are taken
from the same sources as those used in the previous subsections.
Not every worker is insured. Therefore, unlike for pension and health
insurance, we need information on the numbers of uninsured workers. We
specify this as the dierence between the total labor force and the total
number of insured persons. Furthermore, the insurance premium for day-
laborers' insurance is in the form of a lump sum and is independent of the
level of income. For day-laborers' insurance contributors and for uninsured
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workers, the marginal premium rate is zero.
3.4 Average marginal premium rates for accident com-
pensation insurance
In this subsection, we estimate the average marginal rates of accident com-
pensation insurance. We classify accident compensation insurance into Work-
men's Accident Compensation Insurance, Accident Compensation for Na-
tional Government Employees, and Accident Compensation for local Gov-
ernment Employees. The premium rate for Workmen's Accident Compensa-
tion Insurance varies by industry, but we have no time series data on these
rates. Thus, we use the ratio of the payments for these types of insurance
to labor income as the average premium rate. Data on insurance payments
are from the Annual Report on Social Security Statistics (Shakai Hosho Tokei
Nenpo) published by the National Institute of Population and Social Security
Research. As in Section 2.1.2, labor incomes are calculated as (1  )NNP.
3.5 Average marginal premium rates for long-term care
insurance
Long-term care insurance was introduced in 2000. Persons aged 40 to 65
(termed class 2 persons) must pay this insurance premium. Data on the
number of insured persons and the insurance premium rate are taken from
the Social Security Year Book. For uninsured persons, the marginal premium
is zero. The number of uninsured persons is the dierence between the labor
force and the number of insured persons. We compute the weighted aver-
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age of the rates for the insured and uninsured by using the shares of the
corresponding groups as weights.
3.6 Average marginal tax rates including all social se-
curity premium rates
The average marginal premium rates for each type of social security are shown
in rows 2 to 6 of Table 4. The pension insurance rate increases gradually,
but there is little change in the other four rates. Note that the rates of
employment insurance, accident compensation insurance, and long-term care
insurance are no more than 1%.
+++ INSERT TABLE 4 HERE. +++
Now, we can estimate the average marginal tax rates including social
security premiums MMTRL. Let MSST be the sum of all of the social se-
curity premium rates, presented in column 7 of Table 4. When miscellaneous
incomes multiplied by the capital share  are allocated to capital incomes,
we obtain:
MMTRL = MTRL +MSST:
When  = 0 ( = 1), miscellaneous incomes are treated as labor (capital)
incomes.
The solid line in Figure 4 represents the time series for MTTRL. The
rates excluding social security premiums (represented by the broken line,
MTRL) range from 17% to 22% and declined from 1994. Social security
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premiums boost the rate by around 10 percentage points, and the rates in-
cluding premiums have not decreased, even since the 1990s.
+++ INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE. +++
Premiums for the national pension, which accounts for a large share of
social security, is independent of income; that is, the marginal premium rate
is zero. This might reduce the progressiveness of the marginal tax rate on
labor income. To take this eect into account, we also estimate the average
social security tax rate,
ASST = social insurance premiums/labor incomes:
The gures for social insurance premiums are the sum of contributions by em-
ployees and employers from the Annual Reports on Social Security Statistics.
Labor income is calculated as (1  )NNP.
Column 8 of Table 4 reports ASST . In addition, Table 5 and Figure
4 report the sum of ASST and MTRL (AMTRL = MTRL + ASST ),
which is extensively used in the next section to examine the eect of the
progressiveness of taxation excluding social securities on labor income. The
average rate for social security, ASST , ranges from 11% to 17%. Another
type of average marginal tax rate, AMTRL, ranges from 29% to 35% and
is about ve percentage points above MMTRL.
+++ INSERT TABLE 5 HERE. +++
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4 Comparing our Tax Rates with Existing
Average Tax Rates
In this section, we compare our series of average marginal tax rates with the
average tax rates calculated by Mendoza et al. (1994). They used data on
tax revenues from the OECD's Revenue Statistics and data on income and
expenditures from the OECD's National Accounts of OECD Countries. They
present a series of average tax rates on consumption, labor, and capital for
seven OECD countries for the period 1965{96.10 In this section, we compare
our series with their Japanese series. In Figure 5, we compare our average
marginal tax rates on labor income, MMTRL, with the corresponding aver-
age tax rates presented by Mendoza et al. (1994), ATRL.11 Whereas in the
early 1980s the average and marginal tax rates on labor income were similar,
after that, the average rate exceeds the marginal rate. However, apart from
1989{91, the marginal tax rate with average social security premium rates,
AMTRL, exceeds the average rates.
+++ INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE. +++
The fact that marginal average tax rates are lower than average tax rates is
the product of the Japanese tax and social security system. Generally, aver-
age marginal tax rates are raised if income is taxed progressively but lowered
10They originally estimated a series for 1965{86; a series that extends to 1996 is available
from E. G. Mendoza's Web site:
http://econ.server.umd.edu/~mendoza/pp/newdata.pdf.
We cannot construct further updated series because some denitions in Revenues Statistics
changed in 1997.
11Because of data construction, our average marginal tax rates on labor income should
be compared with the sum of their average tax rates on consumption and labor income.
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if there are lump-sum taxes. As already noted, whereas the Japanese so-
cial security system levies social security contributions on most employers in
proportion to their wages, it imposes lump-sum taxes on others, including
the self-employed. In Figure 5, we also present an alternative version of our
estimated series (AMTRL), which is obtained by assuming that social se-
curity contributions are average, rather than marginal, premium rates. This
series exceeds the average tax rate (ATRL) by about one percentage point.
One interpretation of the dierence between AMTRL and ATRL is that it
reects the progressiveness of income tax.
It is interesting that the progressiveness of income tax has a small eect.
In referring to Feenberg and Coutts (1993), Prescott (2004) assumed that the
ratio of marginal tax rates excluding social security contribution rates to the
average tax rates of Mendoza et al. (1994) was 1.6 for the US. Our results
indicate that, in Japan, the ratio is lower, at around 1.1. This dierence
arises because the minimum taxable level of personal income is higher in
Japan than in the US.
In Figure 6, we compare our average marginal tax rates with average tax
rates on capital income. Until 1987, average marginal tax rates (MTRK)
were slightly above average tax rates, but in 1988{91, they were similar.
After that, the marginal tax rate exceeded the average rate. This suggests
that Japanese taxes on capital income are as progressive as taxes on labor
income without social security premiums.
+++ INSERT FIGURE 6 HERE. +++
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5 Comparison with BCA
In this section, we compare our results with wedges from BCA recently devel-
oped by Chari et al. (2007a). In standard calibration analysis, one chooses an
appropriate dynamic macroeconomic model with a plausible set of parame-
ters, estimates exogenous shocks from actual data, and conducts a simulation
to evaluate the impact of each shock on the endogenous variables. In BCA,
one uses a standard dynamic general equilibrium model to estimate the shock
variables, called wedges, from actual endogenous variables, and conducts a
simulation to investigate the extent to which each wedge contributes to ac-
tual business cycles. The BCA wedges are interpreted as taxes that prevent
the economy from achieving its Pareto optimum allocations. The four wedges
considered by Chari et al. (2007a) are eciency, labor, government, and in-
vestment.
Kobayashi and Inaba (2006) and Otsu (2008) applied BCA to the Japanese
economy and concluded that eciency and labor wedges play an important
role in business cycles. These ndings are consistent with those of Hayashi
and Prescott (2002), who found that technology shocks (known as eciency
wedges in BCA terminology) were the most signicant contributors to the
1990s depression, Japan's the lost decade. Prescott (2004) compared labor
wedges and marginal average tax rates on labor income for the G7 coun-
tries including Japan, and concluded that taxes on labor incomes can almost
completely account for labor wedges. For other discussions on wedges, see
Golosov et al. (2006) and Shimer (2009).
Taking BCA analyses into account, we compare our estimated tax rates
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on labor and capital incomes with labor and capital wedges.12 Note that we
use capital wedges although BCA often uses investment wedges. There is
controversy about the relationship between capital and investment wedges.
Christiano and Davis (2006) pointed out that, in models with investment
adjustment costs, replacing investment wedges by capital wedges may aect
the results. In response, Chari et al. (2007b) showed that both wedges are
equivalent mathematically. Thus, for comparison with our series, we use
capital wedges.
Figure 7 illustrates the average marginal tax rate on labor income (MMTRL)
and the labor wedge. The labor wedge exceeds the marginal tax rate through-
out the period. The dierence rises from about ve percentage points at the
beginning of the period to about 15 percentage points at the end. The
labor wedge increased from 1985, whereas the marginal tax rate remained
unchanged at around 30%. The correlation coecient between them is 0.66.
+++ INSERT FIGURE 7 HERE. +++
Overall, the average marginal tax rate explains about 70% of the labor
wedge in terms of mean and correlation. Kobayashi and Inaba (2006) and
Otsu (2008) argued that the labor wedge is an important contributor to
Japanese business cycles. Given their results, the average marginal tax rate
would also be a major factor. Our results imply that social security premiums
account for much of the upward trend in the marginal tax rate on labor
income. As shown in Figure 4, the marginal tax rate excluding social security
12We are grateful to Masaru Inaba for providing data on the labor and capital wedges
analyzed in this section.
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premiums (MTRL) declined from 1990, whereas the rate including social
security premiums (MMTRL) remained steady.
Increased social security burdens might cancel out the eect of tax cuts
on the Japanese economy. A rise in the marginal tax rate on labor income
raises the relative disutility of labor and, consequently, labor supply declines.
In addition, a negative technology shock lowers rms' labor demand. Thus,
in the lost decade, not only might slow technology progress have reduced
output, but reduced labor demand and increased social security premiums
might have lowered labor supply. Both would have negative eects on the
Japanese economy in the long run.
The argument that tax plays an important role in explaining the economy
is not new. As already mentioned, to simulate labor supply using a simple
neoclassical general equilibrium model, Prescott (2004) estimated marginal
tax rates for the G7 countries in the periods 1970{74 and 1993{96. On
the basis that model predictions are consistent with actual values, Prescott
claimed that labor wedges are completely accounted for by marginal tax
rates.
However, we disagree with Prescott (2004) to some extent. Prescott used
Mendoza et al.'s (1994) series of average tax rates for individual G7 coun-
tries, and multiplied each average rate by 1.6 to estimate the marginal rates.
Prescott's gure of 1.6 comes from empirical research on the US (Feenberg
and Coutts, 1993), and is assumed to apply to all G7 countries including
Japan. However, as we showed in the previous section, the ratio excluding
social security premiums in Japan is about 1.1. Thus, we argue that the tax
rate on labor income accounts for no more than 70% of the labor wedge in
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the Japanese economy.
The dierence between average marginal tax rates and labor wedges
widened from the early 1980s, even based on including social security premi-
ums (AMTRL, broken line in Figure 7). This dierence may be the result of
reduced working hours, as suggested by Hayashi and Prescott (2002). Alter-
natively, it may be a result of the recent rapidly accumulating scal decit.
To stimulate the economy, the Japanese government has continued not only
cutting taxes but also issuing bonds. Japan's scal decit as a proportion of
GDP is the highest among the OECD countries. According to the Ricardo{
Barro eect, current scal decits are essentially future taxes.
Figure 8 illustrates the average marginal tax rate and the capital wedge.
Whereas the marginal tax rate stays around 50%, the capital wedge uctuates
substantially, ranging from 33% to over 70%. The average of the marginal
tax rate (0.53) is similar to that of the capital wedge (0.47). However, the
correlation coecient between them is  0:15. The rst-order autocorrelation
coecient for the capital wedge of 0.12 suggests that uctuations in the
capital wedge could be explained by a short-run shock with a mean of zero;
an example is an unexpected monetary shock. According to Kobayashi and
Inaba (2006) and Otsu (2008), the investment wedge, which is equivalent
to the capital wedge, does not make a signicant contribution to Japan's
business cycles.
+++ INSERT FIGURE 8 HERE. +++
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6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have applied the method of Joines (1981) to estimate av-
erage marginal tax rates for Japan from 1980{2003. We considered both
self-assessment taxpayers and withholding income taxpayers. We calculated
their average marginal tax rates separately, and then combined these tax
rates into a weighted average to obtain total average marginal tax rates.
Moreover, we included social security tax rates, which consist of pension
insurance, health insurance, employment insurance, accident compensation
insurance, and long-term care insurance.
We obtained the following results. The average marginal tax rates on
labor income without social security premiums increased until 1990 and then
decreased. The rates with social security premiums remained around 30%
from the mid-1990s. Although the labor tax decreased after the bubble econ-
omy of the late 1980s, increased social security premiums kept the marginal
tax rate stable. Average marginal tax rates on capital income peaked in the
late 1980s and again in the late 1990s.
We also compared our estimates with two existing measures. First, we
compared our estimates with Mendoza et al.'s (1996) average tax rates.
Whereas the average tax rates on labor income tend to be slightly below
the average marginal tax rates with average marginal premium rates of so-
cial security, the average rates are about three percentage points higher than
the average marginal tax rates with average premium rates. This suggests
that social security premiums are regressive and that taxation is progres-
sive, albeit weakly. The average tax rates on capital income were below
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the marginal tax rates for the most of the sample period, 1980{2003. This
suggests that Japan's capital tax is relatively progressive.
We also compared our estimates with the labor and capital wedges esti-
mated by Kobayashi and Inaba (2006). We found that marginal tax rates
on labor incomes account for about 70% of the labor wedge. This implies
that, in the context of Japan's business cycles, labor taxes contribute signi-
cantly to economic depression. However, because the dierence between tax
rates and wedges measures has increased, other contributory factors should
be considered. Our marginal tax rates cannot explain the uctuations in
capital wedges.
Our estimated average marginal tax rates for Japan are unique. Without
them, one cannot use macroeconomic models to investigate the Japanese
economy precisely. Researchers have been forced to use average tax rates or
sample-period means.13 We trust that our estimated average marginal tax
rates will be widely used in studies of the Japanese economy.
Future research tasks are as follows. First, we intend to expand the sample
period. It is possible to extend the 1980{2003 sample at both ends by using
a dierent System of National Accounts (SNA). The National Tax Agency
Annual Statistics Report is available from the mid-Meiji era without wartime
breaks. We are going to maximize the length of the period covered by our
estimated tax rates by linking data based on dierent SNAs with dierent
base years.
Second, we could estimate tax rates more precisely. To estimate tax
rates on factor incomes, which are often used in macroeconomic analysis
13See, for instance, Hayashi and Prescott (2002).
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of the US, we applied the method of Joines (1981), which relies on strong
assumptions. Relaxing the assumptions and estimate average marginal tax
rates nonparametrically would be preferred. Given that Akhand and Liu
(2002) used a nonparametric method to estimate marginal tax rates for the
US, it would be worth applying their method to Japanese data.
Third, it would be worth computing marginal taxes from a dierent data
source. Microeconomic data have recently become more accessible in Japan.
In particular, it would be useful to estimate taxes by using the Family Income
and Expenditure Survey, which is carried out by the Ministry of Internal Af-
fairs and Communications. This would enable the estimation of taxes for
each household. Comparing microeconomic tax with ours would be intrigu-
ing.
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Table 1: Average marginal tax rates of self-assessment income taxpayers
Year MTRLs0 MTRK
s
0 MTRL
s
1 MTRK
s
1 MTRL
s
 MTRK
s

1980 0.2598 0.6368 0.2708 0.5779 0.2615 0.6115
1981 0.2655 0.6580 0.2814 0.5984 0.2678 0.6344
1982 0.2782 0.6752 0.2902 0.6249 0.2799 0.6564
1983 0.2684 0.6751 0.2861 0.6131 0.2709 0.6510
1984 0.2608 0.6931 0.2793 0.6277 0.2634 0.6673
1985 0.2584 0.6746 0.2777 0.6085 0.2614 0.6477
1986 0.2732 0.7155 0.2994 0.6476 0.2773 0.6890
1987 0.2615 0.7314 0.2808 0.6753 0.2646 0.7104
1988 0.2469 0.7141 0.2740 0.6569 0.2511 0.6910
1989 0.2546 0.6949 0.2852 0.6511 0.2594 0.6785
1990 0.2612 0.6468 0.2908 0.6088 0.2660 0.6326
1991 0.2598 0.6416 0.2918 0.5950 0.2650 0.6248
1992 0.2785 0.6630 0.3168 0.5985 0.2839 0.6377
1993 0.2798 0.6709 0.3130 0.6138 0.2841 0.6510
1994 0.2365 0.6537 0.2662 0.5914 0.2400 0.6325
1995 0.2382 0.6891 0.2661 0.6331 0.2414 0.6709
1996 0.2338 0.6633 0.2599 0.6128 0.2370 0.6464
1997 0.2480 0.6846 0.2751 0.6269 0.2512 0.6655
1998 0.2631 0.6853 0.2847 0.6376 0.2656 0.6712
1999 0.2368 0.6651 0.2619 0.6177 0.2393 0.6513
2000 0.2399 0.6354 0.2655 0.5887 0.2429 0.6206
2001 0.2391 0.6580 0.2610 0.6124 0.2415 0.6443
2002 0.2409 0.6376 0.2653 0.5944 0.2436 0.6248
2003 0.2336 0.5762 0.2568 0.5359 0.2364 0.5634
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Table 2: Average marginal tax rates of withholding income taxpayers
Year MTRLw0 MTRK
w
0 MTRL
w
1 MTRK
w
1 MTRL
w
 MTRK
w

1980 0.1673 0.4531 0.1684 0.4487 0.1676 0.4517
1981 0.1749 0.4783 0.1763 0.4738 0.1752 0.4771
1982 0.1798 0.4960 0.1812 0.4917 0.1801 0.4948
1983 0.1815 0.4854 0.1829 0.4836 0.1818 0.4849
1984 0.1820 0.5012 0.1831 0.5012 0.1822 0.5012
1985 0.1841 0.4798 0.1846 0.4832 0.1842 0.4807
1986 0.1915 0.5111 0.1921 0.5146 0.1916 0.5121
1987 0.1938 0.5372 0.1945 0.5412 0.1940 0.5384
1988 0.1830 0.5370 0.1921 0.5249 0.1851 0.5325
1989 0.1811 0.5453 0.1897 0.5289 0.1831 0.5394
1990 0.1887 0.5004 0.1981 0.4867 0.1910 0.4956
1991 0.1946 0.4793 0.2038 0.4675 0.1967 0.4754
1992 0.1981 0.4930 0.2081 0.4796 0.2001 0.4889
1993 0.1967 0.5003 0.2072 0.4856 0.1986 0.4960
1994 0.1873 0.5085 0.1976 0.4892 0.1891 0.5029
1995 0.1745 0.5575 0.1827 0.5358 0.1758 0.5510
1996 0.1733 0.5561 0.1813 0.5186 0.1747 0.5418
1997 0.1816 0.5435 0.1898 0.5169 0.1829 0.5338
1998 0.1781 0.5359 0.1865 0.5133 0.1794 0.5282
1999 0.1725 0.5511 0.1787 0.5282 0.1734 0.5438
2000 0.1724 0.5464 0.1782 0.5152 0.1733 0.5371
2001 0.1716 0.5639 0.1777 0.5371 0.1725 0.5567
2002 0.1666 0.5359 0.1734 0.5046 0.1676 0.5252
2003 0.1612 0.4683 0.1701 0.4381 0.1626 0.4558
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Table 3: Total average marginal tax rates
Year  MTRL0 MTRK0 MTRL1 MTRK1 MTRL MTRK
1980 0.1294 0.1793 0.4769 0.1817 0.4654 0.1797 0.4724
1981 0.1227 0.1860 0.5004 0.1892 0.4891 0.1866 0.4964
1982 0.1252 0.1922 0.5184 0.1948 0.5084 0.1926 0.5151
1983 0.1255 0.1924 0.5092 0.1958 0.4998 0.1930 0.5058
1984 0.1233 0.1917 0.5249 0.1950 0.5168 0.1922 0.5217
1985 0.1236 0.1932 0.5038 0.1961 0.4987 0.1937 0.5014
1986 0.1269 0.2018 0.5370 0.2057 0.5315 0.2025 0.5345
1987 0.1358 0.2030 0.5636 0.2062 0.5594 0.2036 0.5618
1988 0.1365 0.1918 0.5612 0.2033 0.5429 0.1941 0.5541
1989 0.1429 0.1916 0.5667 0.2034 0.5464 0.1940 0.5593
1990 0.1440 0.1992 0.5214 0.2115 0.5043 0.2018 0.5154
1991 0.1388 0.2036 0.5018 0.2160 0.4852 0.2062 0.4962
1992 0.1173 0.2075 0.5129 0.2208 0.4935 0.2099 0.5063
1993 0.1164 0.2064 0.5201 0.2195 0.5006 0.2085 0.5140
1994 0.1083 0.1926 0.5243 0.2050 0.5002 0.1946 0.5169
1995 0.1111 0.1816 0.5721 0.1920 0.5466 0.1831 0.5644
1996 0.1208 0.1806 0.5691 0.1907 0.5300 0.1822 0.5545
1997 0.1107 0.1890 0.5592 0.1992 0.5291 0.1905 0.5484
1998 0.1078 0.1873 0.5520 0.1971 0.5267 0.1887 0.5436
1999 0.1064 0.1794 0.5632 0.1876 0.5377 0.1804 0.5552
2000 0.1039 0.1794 0.5556 0.1873 0.5228 0.1805 0.5458
2001 0.0977 0.1782 0.5731 0.1859 0.5444 0.1792 0.5653
2002 0.1012 0.1742 0.5462 0.1827 0.5137 0.1753 0.5353
2003 0.1043 0.1687 0.4795 0.1792 0.4483 0.1703 0.4670
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Table 4: Average marginal tax rates for social security
Pension Health Employment Accident Care
Year insurance insurance insurance insurance insurance MSST ASST
1980 0.0440 0.0348 0.0062 0.0061 0.0910 0.1137
1981 0.0444 0.0362 0.0063 0.0063 0.0931 0.1193
1982 0.0444 0.0363 0.0064 0.0061 0.0931 0.1218
1983 0.0430 0.0363 0.0064 0.0057 0.0914 0.1231
1984 0.0454 0.0361 0.0064 0.0056 0.0935 0.1238
1985 0.0515 0.0362 0.0065 0.0056 0.0998 0.1290
1986 0.0505 0.0360 0.0064 0.0056 0.0984 0.1316
1987 0.0495 0.0363 0.0064 0.0056 0.0978 0.1318
1988 0.0502 0.0376 0.0067 0.0057 0.1002 0.1316
1989 0.0539 0.0382 0.0068 0.0062 0.1050 0.1350
1990 0.0658 0.0373 0.0069 0.0062 0.1162 0.1419
1991 0.0599 0.0395 0.0070 0.0062 0.1125 0.1412
1992 0.0580 0.0389 0.0069 0.0061 0.1099 0.1414
1993 0.0612 0.0389 0.0057 0.0060 0.1118 0.1431
1994 0.0616 0.0391 0.0057 0.0058 0.1122 0.1449
1995 0.0684 0.0394 0.0057 0.0053 0.1189 0.1535
1996 0.0710 0.0392 0.0057 0.0052 0.1212 0.1550
1997 0.0700 0.0400 0.0057 0.0051 0.1208 0.1566
1998 0.0709 0.0396 0.0057 0.0048 0.1210 0.1584
1999 0.0708 0.0397 0.0057 0.0045 0.1207 0.1577
2000 0.0705 0.0408 0.0057 0.0045 0.0038 0.1252 0.1605
2001 0.0703 0.0404 0.0086 0.0043 0.0069 0.1305 0.1652
2002 0.0698 0.0404 0.0087 0.0042 0.0068 0.1300 0.1674
2003 0.0709 0.0432 0.0088 0.0037 0.0057 0.1323 0.1653
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Table 5: Labor tax rates with social security premiums
Year MMTRL0 MMTRL1 MMTRL AMTRL
1980 0.2703 0.2727 0.2708 0.2935
1981 0.2791 0.2823 0.2797 0.3059
1982 0.2853 0.2880 0.2858 0.3144
1983 0.2839 0.2873 0.2845 0.3161
1984 0.2852 0.2885 0.2857 0.3160
1985 0.2931 0.2959 0.2936 0.3227
1986 0.3002 0.3041 0.3009 0.3341
1987 0.3008 0.3040 0.3014 0.3354
1988 0.2920 0.3035 0.2944 0.3258
1989 0.2966 0.3084 0.2990 0.3290
1990 0.3154 0.3277 0.3180 0.3437
1991 0.3161 0.3285 0.3187 0.3474
1992 0.3174 0.3307 0.3198 0.3513
1993 0.3181 0.3313 0.3203 0.3517
1994 0.3048 0.3172 0.3067 0.3395
1995 0.3005 0.3109 0.3020 0.3366
1996 0.3017 0.3119 0.3033 0.3372
1997 0.3098 0.3200 0.3113 0.3471
1998 0.3083 0.3181 0.3097 0.3471
1999 0.3000 0.3082 0.3011 0.3381
2000 0.3046 0.3125 0.3058 0.3410
2001 0.3088 0.3164 0.3098 0.3445
2002 0.3042 0.3127 0.3053 0.3427
2003 0.3011 0.3115 0.3026 0.3355
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Figure 1: Average marginal tax rates for self-assessment income taxpayers
Note: (a) MTRL and (b) MTRK are the average marginal tax rates of self-assessment
income taxpayers on labor and capital incomes, respectively.
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Figure 2: Average marginal tax rates for withholding income taxpayers
Note: (a) MTRL and (b) MTRK are the average marginal tax rates of withholding
income taxpayers on labor and capital incomes, respectively.
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Figure 3: Total average marginal tax rates without social security premiums
Note: (a) MTRL and (b) MTRK are the total average marginal tax rates on labor and
capital incomes, respectively.
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Figure 4: Average marginal tax rates on labor income with social security
premiums
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Figure 5: Marginal and average tax rates on labor income
58
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
ATRL (Mendoza-Razin-Tesar)
MMTRK
Student Version of MATLAB
Figure 6: Marginal and average tax rates on capital income
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Figure 7: Marginal tax rates on labor income and labor wedges
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Figure 8: Marginal tax rates on capital income and capital wedges
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